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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
constitutional provision which forbids a limitation on wrongful death
recoveries. This is so, because by its nature as a treaty, the Warsaw
Convention ranks with the Federal Constitution as the supreme law
of the land and transcends all conflicting state laws. It has been
held that the treaty is self-executing and that it is constitutional and
in derogation of no power of Congress and no personal right." 7 No
right of action for wrongful death is found in the Convention so the
beneficiaries of the action and the substantive law of damages would
have to be ascertained by the death statute of the place of the acci-
dent." 8 Thus, the New York law discussed above, would control only
when the accident occurs in this jurisdiction. However, by Article
XXVIII of the Convention, the plaintiff has the option of bringing
the action in the courts of: (1) the carrier's domicile, (2) the car-
rier's principal place of business, (3) the place of business through
which the contract of carriage was made, or (4) the place of destin-
ation. Since by the same Article, all questions of procedure are
to be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
the adjective law of New York may be applicable when, in any of
the above instances, the action is brought here.
JusTiN L. ViGDOR,
JAMES P. KEHOE.
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 84 OF THE CIVIL
PRACTICE ACT
The word arbitration is ordinarily applied to an extrajudicial
hearing and determination of a matter or matters of difference be-
tween contending parties by arbiters either chosen by the parties in-
volved, or appointed by the court.' The decision rendered is called
an award. This procedure may embrace either international, labor,
or commercial controversies. The discussion herein will be limited
to the last mentioned type of dispute.
The inception of this special type of proceeding occurred early
in man's history. The Greeks and Romans were familiar with its
process, and from the charters that were issued to the English guilds,
117 Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 1945
U. S. Av. R. 52 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
I'8 Choy v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 1941 U. S. Av. R. 10, 1942 U. S.
Av. R. 93.
16 WIu.IsroN, CONTRACTS § 1918 (rev. ed. 1938); see invaluable sym-
posium on arbitration in 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 119 (1934).
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it is certain that these traders appreciated the utility of some extra-
judicial method; and from some of the earlier books on the law mer-
chant, it is unquestionable that the merchant preferred justice ac-
cording to the law merchant rather than that of the common law.2
Arbitration clauses in contracts directed to disputes which might
arise in the future from such contracts have been held valid at com-
mon law from an early date, as have agreements to arbitrate existing
controversies, that is, submission agreements. 3 But even though such
contracts were valid, either party could sue and recover a final judg-
ment in direct repudiation of his agreement to arbitrate. The other
party's remedy was for breach of contract, generally valueless, as he
could not prove any damages.4  The reasoning behind this common
law principle was that executory arbitration agreements could be re-
voked. This crystallized rule found its genesis in dictum by Lord
Coke in Vynior's Case.5 The basic reason for this dictum and the
cause of its general acceptance, appears to have been that executory
arbitration agreements, while not absolutely illegal, were opposed to
public policy because they tended to oust the courts of jurisdiction.6
Equity would not compel specific performance of these execu-
tory agreements, nor would it appoint an arbitrator or compel an
arbitrator to act. Because of the common law revocable character of
these agreements, it felt such a decree would be vain, as either party
could revoke up to the time of the award, and thus, substantially
nullify the decree.7 However, once an award had been made pur-
suant to an arbitration contract, equity would enforce it specifically,
if a contract between the parties in the same terms was entitled to
equitable relief." An action at law would also be sustained on an
award for a sum certain in money. 9
2 BRITTON, BI.Ls & NoTEs § 2 (1943); Wolaver, The Historical Back-
ground of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 132 (1934) ; Sayre,
Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L. J. 595 (1928).
3 Union Insurance Co. v. Central Trust Co., 157 N. Y. 633, 52 N. E. 671
(1899); Haggart v. Morgan, 5 N. Y. 422 (1851); see Matter of Berkovitz
v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 271, 130 N. E. 288, 290 (1921).
4 WALSH, EQurry § 64 (1930).
5 ". . . if I submit myself to an arbitriment . . .yet I may revoke it for
my act, or my words cannot alter the judgment of the law to make that ir-
revocable which is of its own nature revocable." 8 Co. 80a, 81b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 595, 597 (K. B. 1609). It seems Lord Coke did not appreciate
any system of jurisprudence which tended to reduce the jurisdiction of the
common law courts. For his controversy over the jurisdiction of equity see
AmES, LEcTUREs ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913); AmEs, CASES IN EQUITY JURIs-
DICTION, p. 5 (1905).
6 Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wilson 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 539 (K. B. 1746).7 RsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 377 (1932); Pound, The Progress of the
Law--Equity, 33 HARv. L. Rzv. 420, 434 (1920).
8 Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 160 (1934).9 See Howe v. Nickerson, 14 Allen 400, 409 (Mass. 1867); Sandford
Laundry, Inc. v. Simon, 285 N. Y. 488, 493, 35 N. E. 2d 182, 185 (1941).
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This common law rule of revocability was so solidified that it
could be changed only by legislation.10 Recognizing this, New York
in 1920, provided for specific enforcement of arbitration agreements
by virtue of the New York Arbitration Law," later incorporated into
the New York Civil Practice Act, Article 84, Sections 1448 to 1469.
In substance this legislation authorizes direct enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements by an order compelling arbitration; provides for the
stay of any action commenced in violation of such an arbitration
clause, thereby indirectly compelling arbitration; and furnishes an
auxiliary method of enforcement by an order appointing arbi-
trators empowered with irrevocable authority to proceed with the
arbitration. 12
The constitutionality of this legislation was upheld against par-
ticular claims. 13 Common law arbitration was not abrogated by this
enactment. It is supplementary rather than exclusive.' 4  Vhere the
parties do not manifest their purpose to arbitrate under statute by
executing a written agreement according to the legislation, common
law rules of arbitration generally control.
Section 1448 states in effect, that parties may submit to arbi-
tration any controversy existing at the time of submission which may
be the subject of an action or they may contract to settle by arbitra-
tion disputes thereafter arising and such submission or contract shall
be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or equity, for the revocation of any contract. In 1941, there
was added the further clause that such submission or contract may
include questions arising out of valuations or appraisals which are
collateral, incidental, precedent or subsequent to any issue between
the parties. It is to be noted that there is a difference between ap-
praisal and arbitration.' 5 Appraisal had been invariably observed as
the reference of a collateral or incidental matter of calculation, the
decision of which is conclusive of nothing except the amount due,
while arbitration was the submission of all matters that are in con-
troversy between the parties for ultimate legal liability. 16 Appraisal,
10 Finucane Co..v. Board of Education, 190 N. Y. 76, 82 N. E. 737 (1907) ;
People ex rel. Union Insurance Co. v. Nash, 111 N. Y. 310, 18 N. E. 630
(1888).
" Arbitration Law, constituting Chapter 72 of Consolidated Laws, re-
pealed by Laws of N. Y. 1937, c. 341.
12 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1920 (rev. ed. 1938).
13 Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E.
288 (1921) (right of trial by jury, impairment of contract obligations, reserv-
ing general jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New York) ; Mohawk Manu-
facturing Co. v. Cavicchi, 281 N. Y. 629, 22 N. E. 2d 179 (1939) (patent
infringement).
14 French v. Petrinovic, 184 Misc. 406, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1945);
see Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Woltz, 234 App. Div. 823, 253 N. Y. Supp. 583
(4th Dep't 1931).
15 STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION & AWARD § 7 (1930).
16 Matter of American Ins. Co., 208 App. Div. 168, 203 N. Y. Supp. 206
(1st Dep't 1924).
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it was considered, allowed a less restrictive inquiry and was not ex-
pected to be a method to settle matters in a quasi judicial manner,
as is the objective of arbitration. It was thought that its manner was
ministerial rather than judicial. The fulcrum of this ruling was that
such an incidental reference of an amount due merely substituted the
judgment of the appraisers for evidence of value on a collateral mat-
ter and left the rest of the controversy open for adjudication in the
legal form.17 It was considered that arbitrators can deal only with
controversies open to judicial cognizance.' 8 For these reasons, it
was stated prior to 1941 that appraisals were not within the purview
of Article 84 of the New York Civil Practice Act, and thus, not en-
titled to its benefits.
In June, 1949, however, the Appellate Division ' 9 had an oppor-
tunity to construe the effect of the clause added in 1941, mentioned
heretofore. Predicating its decision on the basis that the amendment
is remedial 20 in character and thus should be liberally construed, and
also, that it was intended to secure some useful purpose, the court
held that an appraisal agreement, even though it isn't part and parcel
of a primary arbitration clause, is specifically enforceable under this
article. Two rules which may be gleaned from this decision are:
(1) it is not essential that parties contract to submit the whole sub-
ject matter of dispute to arbitration; and, (2) it is not necessary
that the award be conclusive upon the parties' ultimate rights. How-
ever, these rules may be limited, by a statement of the court to the
effect that the case is one in which the entire controversy is encom-
passed in the appraisal, i.e., a situation where the amount of loss is
the only subject of dispute.
It is submitted that the desirability of such a ruling is consistent
with the policy of the state in its attitude toward arbitration. It is
difficult to question the holding when one considers the advantages
which will ensue from its equalizing effect on the status of insurer
and insured, since the majority of appraisal clauses are found in in-
surance policies. As was indicated by the court, if the insured re-
pudiated the standard appraisal clause,21 he was generally denied the
right to sue because it was necessary to prove fulfillment by him of
all terms and conditions of the contract. Thus the insurer could in-
directly compel an appraisal. On the other hand, repudiation of it by
the insurer only subjected him to an action for damages which gen-
erally proved to be worthless. This peculiarity may have been in-
ducive to the decision.
17 Garr v. Gomez, 9 Wend. 649 (N. Y. 1832).
18 See Matter of Kallus, 292 N. Y. 459, 462, 55 N. E. 2d 737, 738 (1944).
19 Matter of Fitzgerald, 275 App. Div. 453, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 430 (3d Dep't),
leave to appeal denied, 275 App. Div. 1005, 91 N. Y. S. 2d 519 (3d Dep't 1949).
20 For various connotations placed upon this word by the courts, see
3 SUTrtaLAXD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, p. 68 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
21 This clause is required by N. Y. INSURANCE LAW § 168(6).
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If it is ever necessary, however, for the court of last resort to
consider and pass upon this decision, it seems that approval of this
holding may meet the following criticism. The court premised its
reasoning on the theory that the legislature must have intended to
secure some useful purpose by adding this clause. However, to this
one might answer that the instances of the legislature in doing no
more than codifying the existing law are legion. One will find in
the section under consideration that the legislature says that these
arbitration contracts shall be valid. Did the legislature intend any
useful purpose by that statement? Of course not. As was expressed
heretofore in this article, these contracts were valid even before legis-
lation, thus, this part of the statute did nothing more than reiterate
the common law; if the legislature intended to change this well-
entrenched attitude toward appraisal agreements, it seems that the
clause would have been couched in a more direct language which
would clearly evidence that intention. On a reading of the clause,
it clearly appears that the legislature intended that these appraisal
agreements should rest upon a primary and subsisting arbitration
clause or submission agreement. In substance the clause says that
such contract, referring to the arbitration agreement and not the
overall commercial contract, may include appraisal agreements. It
is difficult to reconcile this decision to a normal reading of the clause.
The word "irrevocable" as used in Section 1448, means the con-
tract to arbitrate cannot be revoked at the will of one party. It can
be modified by subsequent agreement based on consideration or aban-
doned or waived by words or acts of the parties; one waives his
right by bringing an action on the contract.2 2  A defendant's right
will be considered as waived when it is not insisted upon prior to the
time of trial.2 From the decisions on this relative point, one would
gather that the mere service of the answer constitutes a waiver. But
one does not waive his right by filing an amended answer reserving
his right to arbitrate to an amended complaint alleging new causes
of action, even though the former answer did not allege this right.2 4
Nor does the defendant waive by moving to dismiss the complaint
or by moving to have the causes of action separately stated and
numbered. 25  It had been held that filing a mechanic's lien indicating
22 Matter of Zimmerman, 236 N. Y. 15, 139 N. E. 764 (1923) ; Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. Parsons & Whillimore, 255 App. Div. 589, 8 N. Y. S. 2d
432 (1st Dep't 1938). See Note, 117 A. L. R. 304 (1938).
23 Nagy v. Arcas Brass & Iron Co., 242 N. Y. 97, 150 N. E. 614 (1926);
Bauer Co. v. Anderson Chemical Co., 206 App. Div. 423, 201 N. Y. Supp. 438
(1st Dep't 1923) ; Samuels v. Samis, 124 Misc. 35, 207 N. Y. Supp. 249 (N. Y.
Munic. Ct. 1924).
24 Dandy Dress v. Rae Dress Co., 179 Misc. 36, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 449 (Sup.
Ct. 1942). See Note, 161 A. L. R. 1427 (1946).
25 Haupt v. Rose, 265 N. Y. 108, 191 N. E. 853 (1934).
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an intent to forego rights of arbitration was a waiver,2 6 but this rule
was later nullified by statute.2 7
There are two types of arbitration clauses-limited and unlimited.
The latter makes provision for the arbitration of any and all con-
troversies arising out of the contract, the former provides for spe-
cific types of disputes arising from the agreement. The clause must
cover the dispute which has arisen. The courts have manifested an
intention to construe them strictly as is evidenced from the following
language used by the court in Matter of General Silk Importing Co.,2
* . since the contract to arbitrate presupposes an agreement to
forego the rights to resort to the courts for redress, an alleged con-
tract to arbitrate will be subjected to strict construction in order that
the parties may not be deprived of their constitutional rights to seek
redress in the court." And yet it also may be for the reason that
these agreements oust the courts of their jurisdiction.29
The following clauses were considered not to include the dis-
putes attempted to be arbitrated: a clause which provided for the
submission of "all questions that may arise under this contract and
in the performance of the work thereunder" was thought not to in-
clude a claim for damages arising from acts of the owner which were
not done under and in performance of the contract but in violation
and repudiation of the building contract; 30 a clause that the sales
be governed by raw silk rules adopted by an association is not a con-
tract to arbitrate differences between the parties; 31 a provision that
disputes over its terms should be settled by arbitration, does not cover
a dispute as to a matter about which the parties had orally agreed to
make another contract; 82 under a stipulation that arbitration was to
be invoked in the event that the parties disagreed "in relation to any
clause in this contract," disputes concerning delays and hindrances
not referable to a particular clause are not arbitrable; 3s a clause in a
contract of sale by a foreign seller to a domestic buyer providing that
the seller's agent guarantees an award, if any, may not be construed
as an agreement on the agent's part to arbitrate.34  A motion to
26Young v. Crescent Development Co., 240 N. Y. 244, 148 N. E. 510
(1925).27 N. Y. LiN LAW § 35.
28200 App. Div. 786, 792, 194 N. Y. Supp. 15, 20 (1st Dep't), aff'd without
opin0in, 234 N. Y. 513, 138 N. E. 427 (1922); accord, Matter of Marchant
v. Mead-Morrison Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386 (1929).29 
"Observe reader your old books, for they are the fountains out of which
these resolutions issue . ." Lord Coke, commenting on Spencer's Case,
5 Co. 16a, 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 76 (K. B. 1583).30 See Young v. Crescent Development Co., 240 N. Y. 244, 148 N. E. 510
(1925).3
" Bachmann, Emmerich & Co. v. S. A. Wenger & Co., 204 App. Div. 282,
197 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1st Dep't 1923).32 Buxton v. Mallery, 245 N. Y. 337, 157 N. E. 259 (1927).
33 Smith Fireproof Construction Co. v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 247 N. Y.
277, 160 N. E. 369 (1928).
34 Matter of Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 264 N. Y. 130, 190 N. E. 208 (1934).
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compel arbitration because of unpaid notes given pursuant to a con-
tract which provided for arbitration was denied on the ground that
there was no dispute since the defendant admitted liability.35
On the other hand, a clause reading, "any dispute arising out of
this contract shall be arbitrated" gave arbitrators the power to deter-
mine any dispute as to the construction of the contract; 36 a clause
stating, "any dispute arising under this contract shall be submitted to
an arbitrator" included a claim for damages for breach of contract; 37
customer's contract with broker authorizing the latter to close out
former's account when broker deemed it necessary and including a
clause, "any controversy arising between us shall be determined by
arbitration" was held to cover a dispute over a guaranty by the cus-
tomer of his brother's account with the broker made three years
later.38
Parties, fearing judicial interpretation not in accord with their
intent, may tend to incorporate the unlimited type of clause. Caution
should be exercised in implementing an unlimited clause, because
arbitrators are not bound by rules of law, such as contract and evi-
dence principles, nor by precedent. Thus, prudently drawn protec-
tive clauses may be ignored by the arbitrator. Each situation will
require careful consideration so that the intention of the parties as to
the type of dispute they wish to be settled by arbitration will be
carried out.3 9
Section 1449 provides for the necessity of a writing. To fall
within the scope of this article, a contract to arbitrate must be in
writing. A submission agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute
is void unless it or some memorandum thereof be in writing and sub-
scribed by the party to be charged or by his lawful agent. It is to
be noted that only a submission agreement must be subscribed while
the contract to arbitrate future controversy need only be in writing.40
The direct enforcement of arbitration agreements by an order
compelling arbitration is authorized by Section 1450. Proceedings
under this section presuppose the existence of a valid and enforce-
able contract at the time the remedy is sought, since arbitration
clauses are directed to the remedy and not to the validity or existence
of the contract itself.41 Thus, a provision for arbitration may be
35 Matter of Webster v. Van Allen, 217 App. Div. 219, 216 N. Y. Supp.
552 (4th Dep't 1926) (strong dissenting opinion).
36 Itob & Co., Ltd. v. Boyer Oil Co., Inc., 198 App. Div. 881, 191 N. Y.
Supp. 290 (1st Dep't 1921). See Note, 136 A. L. R. 366 (1942).
37 General Footwear v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 252 N. Y. 577, 170
N. E. 149 (1929).
38 Matter of Newburger v. Lubell, 257 N. Y. 213, 177 N. E. 424 (1931).
39 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1924 (rev. ed. 1938).
40 Samuel Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. Fascinator Blouse Co., 70 N. Y. S. 2d S
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
41 Matter of Kramer & Uchitelle, 288 N. Y. 467, 43 N. E. 2d 493 (1942).
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resisted.42 A motion to compel arbitration is generally upheld or
denied on the following rationale. Whether the parties made a con-
tract to arbitrate is to be decided by the court regardless of whether
that question be one of law or fact.43  This is so, even though a case
may involve inquiry to determine whether the apparent consent of
one party was induced by fraud 44 or duress. 45  The same is appli-
cable to infants' 46 and illegal 47 transactions. Where the arbitration
clause is but an incidental part of an indivisible contract which has
been ended by force niajeure after its formation, the clause falls
along with the other parts of the contract and arbitration will not
be ordered,48 as in the above situations where the primary contract
is either void, voidable or unenforceable.4 9  But where the contract
has been made providing for arbitration of controversies, arbitration
is generally ordered, even though it is claimed that the contract was
cancelled by act of the parties,50 and even though one party has so
acted as to give ground for rescission, unless rescission has already
been obtained by judicial decree.51 It is thought that such facts
should be ascertained by the arbitrator.52 The distinguishing feature
appears to be that in the former where the motion to arbitrate was
denied the parties defended on the ground that there was no valid
or enforceable contract or that the contract was put to an end by a
force majeure, whereas in the latter where the motion to arbitrate
42 Manufacturers Chemical Co., Inc. v. Caswell Strauss & Co., 259 App.
Div. 321, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 171 (1st Dep't 1940), appeal dinnissed, 283 N. Y.
679, 28 N. E. 2d 404 (1940).
43 But by virtue of Section 1450 of this article a jury may be demanded.44 Newburger v. Gold, 229 App. Div. 572, 243 N. Y. Supp. 51 (1st Dep't),
aff'd without ophzion', 255 N: Y. 532, 175 N. E. 301 (1930); Ermolieff v.
Liss, 140 Misc. 214, 250 N. Y. Supp. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Horli Chemical
Sales Corp. v. Aliphant, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1945). See Metro
Goldwyn Mayer v. Dewitt Development Corp., 150 Misc. 408, 269 N. Y. Supp.
104 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
45 Application of Gruen, 173 Misc. 765, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 999 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
46 Farin v. Sercarz, 179 Misc. 490, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
47 Metro Plan v. Miscione, 257 App. Div. 652, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 35 (1st
Dep't 1939) (usury); cf. In re Gale v. Hilts, 262 App. Div. 834, 28 N. Y. S.
2d 270 (1st Dep't 1941) (usury); STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION &
AwAns § 61 (1930).
48 Matter of Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 288 N. Y. 467, 43 N. E. 2d 493
(1942).
49 But cf. Matter of Exeter Mfg. Co., 254 App. Div. 496, 5 N. Y. S. 2d
438 (1st Dep't 1938) (majority held that since this legislation had its own
Statute of Frauds section, that Section 85 of the New York Personal Property
Law was not a defense to a motion for arbitration, but see strong dissenting
opinion).
50 Lipman v. Haeuser Shellac Co., 289 N. Y. 76, 43 N. E. 2d 817 (1942)
Aqua Mfg. Co. v. Warshow & Sons, 179 Misc. 949, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 564 (Sup.
Ct. 1943).5Matter of Kahn's Application, 284 N. Y. 515, 32 N. E. 2d 534 (1940).
52 Prof. Williston is of the opinion that the court should determine these
facts, W wLIsToN, CoNTRAcTs § 1920 n. 28 (rev. ed. 1938).
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was allowed the defense interposed was the act of the parties them-
selves and the parties clearly intended to arbitrate disputes arising
from their acts under the contract, and just as clearly did not intend
to arbitrate the legal effect of government action (force majeure) on
their contract, or that there was a primary contract at the outset.
It is to be noted that there may be an enforceable submission agree-
ment of an existing dispute regardless of the validity of the document
which gave rise to it except where the submission contract itself is
unenforceable or illegal. 5
3
The Supreme Court is exclusively empowered by Section 1451
to enjoin any action brought in violation of an agreement to settle
differences extrajudicially. 4 This is the indirect method of compul-
sion mentioned above. If the issues in an action are clearly referable
to arbitration, a motion for an order staying all proceedings until
arbitration shall have been had must be granted by the court.5 5 The
stay provided for in this statute is the exclusive remedy of a defen-
dant, that is, it is exclusive in the sense that it is not proper for him
to plead the arbitration agreement as a defense or counterclaim be-
cause the maximum legal effect of such pleading is that the defendant
evinces a manifestation not to waive his right to compel arbitration
under Section 1450. The courts feel that the Legislature has pro-
vided a method of enforcing that which was previously unenforce-
able and thus, the defendant must use those means or none at all.
Certainly, it can not be said that a plaintiff fails to state a prima
facie cause of action merely because the contract upon which suit is
brought includes an agreement to arbitrate which is not a condition
precedent.56 As one may waive his right to enforce arbitration, so
one may waive his right to compel a stay of proceeding. 57
Section 1452 provides the machinery for maintaining arbitration
where the parties failed to provide for it or where their own arrange-
ment has not succeeded. If no method is set forth in the contract to
name an umpire, or if a mode is furnished and any party fails to
avail himself of the plan, or if for any reason there is a lapse in des-
ignating one, then, upon application of either party to the contro-
versy, the Supreme Court shall appoint an arbitrator or as many as
the case requires. But, unless it is otherwise provided for, the arbi-
53 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1921 (rev. ed. 1938).
54 Kipp v. Hamburg-American Line, 134 Misc. 481, 235 N. Y. Supp. 450(Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd without opinion, 228 App. Div. 802, 239 N. Y. Supp.
914 (1st Dep't 1930) (City Court of New York City has no jurisdiction
under this section).
55 Syracuse Plaster Co. v. Agostine Brothers Bldg. Corp., 169 Misc. 564,
7 N. Y. S. 2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1938).56American Reserve Insurance Co. v. China Insurance Co., 297 N. Y. 322,
79 N. E. 2d 425 (1948).
5 Mbatter of Z;mmerman, 236 N. Y. 15, 139 N. E. 764 (1923). But cf.
Chapman-Kruge Corp. v. Jaffe, 239 App. Div. 795, 263 N. Y. Supp. 737 (2d
Dep't 1933).
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tration shall be by a single arbiter. An umpire selected by the court
has the same power as if he had been specifically named in the
agreement.
The procedure for the appointment of an additional arbitrator
is found in Section 1453. But, unless the contract expressly states
that an additional umpire shall be selected, an extra one cannot be
named. This additional arbitrator must sit with the original arbi-
trators upon the hearing and if testimony has been taken before his
selection, the matter must be reheard unless rehearing is waived in
the agreement or by the subsequent written consent of the parties.
In construing this statute, it has been held that where the agreement
provided for the choosing of a substitute if one of the arbitrators
ceases to act, a vacancy need not be filled, if the withdrawal of one
of three arbitrators occurs after the case had been heard, considered,
and practically decided, since the withdrawal did not prejudice the
parties' rights to a hearing before a full board, and because the award
to be valid required only a majority voteY8
Section 1454 prescribes the method by which the hearings will
be carried out subject to any terms in the agreement. The arbitra-
tors must appoint a time and place for a hearing of the differences
submitted to them and must notify each of the parties. A majority
of them may adjourn the hearing from time to time upon the appli-
cation of either party for a good cause shown or upon their own
volition. However, they cannot adjourn beyond the day fixed for
rendering the award unless the time is extended by the written con-
sent of the parties,5 9 or unless the parties continue with the pro-
ceedings after the adjournment without objecting. The court has the
power to order the arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing
and determination.
At common law the arbiters were not required to take an oath, 0
but by legislation it is now necessary. Section 1455 states, "Before
hearing any testimony, arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this
article or otherwise 61 must be sworn, ...." By the word "other-
wise," the oath is applicable to common law arbitration as well as
proceedings under this article.62  This requirement may be waived
by the written consent of the parties, or if they continue with the
hearing without objecting to the failure of the umpires to take the
oath.
58 Matter of A. E. Fire Insurance Co., 240 N. Y. 398, 148 N. E. 562 (1925).59Matter of Slater, 236 App. Div. 694, 258 N. Y. Supp. 253 (2d Dep't
1932).60 STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITARION AWARD § 208 (1930).6 1 Italics mine.
62 Hinkle v. Zimmerman, 184 N. Y. 114, 76 N. E. 1080 (1906); Keppler
v. Nessler, 225 App. Div. 99, 232 N. Y. Supp. 232 (1st Dep't 1928).
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It should be observed that neither this section nor Section 1453
requires the swearing of witnesses as an indispensable part of the
proceedings. 63
At common law where the arbitration necessitated a hearing by
three, with authority in two to make an award, two had the right to
hear when the third was notified and refused to attend; 64 but today
under Section 1456 all of them are required to hear all of the evi-
dence, otherwise, the award is a nullity.6 5  Even though all must
attend the hearing, an award by a majority is valid unless the con-
currence of all is expressly required in the agreement. They may
require any person to appear before them as a witness, and they have
the same powers which are conferred upon a board authorized by
law to receive testimony.66
In the absence of an express agreement in the contract, the fees
and expenses of the arbitrators are governed by Section 1457. The
award may require the payment, by either party, of their fees and
expenses not to exceed the amount which is allowed to a like number
of referees in the Supreme Court. If they claim under this section,
they may not demand the monies in advance of the award.67 The
fact that an award allowed fees in excess of the amounts stipulated
by this section does not in and of itself require vacatur of the award.68
And they are not denied compensation by reason of the refusal of
the court to enforce their award where there is no claim of fraud
or corruption.69
Confirmation and enforceability of the award is authorized by
Section 1458 without previous adjudication of the existence of a con-
tract to arbitrate. However, a party who has not participated in
any of the proceedings and who has not been served with an appli-
cation to compel arbitration under Section 1450 may put in issue the
making of the contract, when confirmation of the award is sought.
But, if a notice of an intention to conduct the proceedings has been
personally served upon him, he may only raise the above issue by a
motion to stay arbitration. Notice of this motion must be served
within ten days after the service of th'e notice of an intention to
arbitrate. The notice to arbitrate must expressly state that unless
within ten days after its service, the party served therewith, serve
63 Hano v. Isaac I Blanchard Co., 199 N. Y. Supp. 227 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
64 Crofoot v. Allen, 2 Wend. 494 (N. Y. 1829).
65 Bullard v. Morgan H. Grace Co., Inc., 240 N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559
(1925); cf. Matter of A. E. Fire Insurance Co. v. N. J. Insurance Co., 240
N. Y. 398, 148 N. E. 562 (1925).
66 Cf. Matter of Sun-Ray Cloak Co., Inc., 256 App. Div. 620, 11 N. Y. S.
2d 202 (1st Dep't 1939) (power to issue subpoena).
67 Hub Industries v. George Mfg. Corp., 269 App. Div. 177, 54 N. Y. S.
2d 741 (2d Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 294 N. Y. 897, 63 N. E. 2d 28 (1945).
68In re Blaike, 119 Misc. 791, 198 N. Y. Supp. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd
without opinion, 206 App. Div. 740, 199 N. Y. Supp. 911 (1st Dep't 1923).
69 Everett v. Erie County, 148 Misc. 778, 266 N. Y. Supp. 2V9 (Sup. Ct.
1933).
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a notice of a motion to stay the arbitration, he will thereafter be
barred from putting in issue the making of the contract. This pro-
vision is necessary so that a party is not denied "due process of law"
because such a statement sets forth the consequences to follow on a
failure to act.7 0 Where a party in either a motion to stay, or in
opposition to the award, sets forth evidentiary facts raising a sub-
stantial issue as to the making of the contract, an immediate trial
of this issue, without a jury, shall be had. The provision that a
notice of an intention to arbitrate be personally served is not man-
datory. The only consequence of personal service of such notice is
to require the objectant to raise the issue by a motion for a stay,
while if it is not personally served, he may raise the objection on
the motion to confirm the award. 7
1
Section 1459 declares that arbitration of a controversy shall be
deemed a special proceeding 72 of which the court specified in the
contract or if none is specified, the Supreme Court shall have juris-
diction,73 and that any application to the court shall be made and
heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing
of motions except as otherwise expressly provided for in this article.
Thus, a bill of particulars 74 or examination before trial 7. is not
allowed.
Under Section 1460, the award to be enforceable must be in
writing, and must be made within the time limited by the agreement,76
subscribed by the arbiters,77 acknowledged 78 or proved and certified
in the same manner as a recorded deed and either filed with the clerk
of the court having jurisdiction as set forth in Section 1459 or de-
livered to one of the parties.
In order to confirm the award, Section 1461 requires that either
party to the controversy must apply to the court having jurisdiction
70 MacNamara v. Doubleday, 270 App. Div. 645, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (3d
Dep't 1946); Schafran & Finkel v. Lowenstein & Sons, 280 N. Y. 164, 19
N. E. 2d 1005 (1939).
71 Matter of United Culinary Employees, 272 App. Div. 491, 71 N. Y. S.
2d 160 (1st Dep't 1947), aF'd tthout opinion, 299 N. Y. 577, 86 N. E. 2d
104 (1949) ; Matter of Hesslein & Co., 281 N. Y. 26, 22 N. E. 2d 149 (1939).7 2 I re Vanguard Films, 188 Misc. 796, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 893 (Sup. Ct.
1947).
73 Wolf X-Ray Products, Inc. v. Sun Tool & Gauge Corp., 52 N. Y. S. 2 d
924 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
74 Smyth v. Board of Education of the Town of North Hempstead, 128
Misc. 49, 217 N. Y. Supp. 231 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
75 Matter of Isador Schwartz, 127 Misc. 452, 217 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct.
1925).
76 Matter of Broadway-Fortieth St. Corp., 296 N. Y. 165, 71 N. E. 2d 451
(1947).
77 Matter of Yeshiva Rabbi Solomon Kluger, 188 Misc. 179, 65 N. Y. S. 2d
524 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
78 Abrams v. Lewis Purses, Inc., 172 Misc. 579, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 903 (Sup.
Ct. 1939); Amfo Realty Corp. v. Triad Portable Case Corp., 72 N. Y. S. 2d
326 (Sup. Ct. 1947); In re Herman, 170 Misc. 852, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 46 (Sup.
Ct. 1938).
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within one year of its making. The court must grant such an order 79
unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected 8 0 as prescribed
in the next two sections or is unenforceable by virtue of Section 1458.
Section 1462 makes it mandatory for the court to vacate an
award on the application of any party to the dispute: I" where it
was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 82 where
there was evident partiality 83 or misconduct by refusing to adjourn
on a good cause shown,84 or by refusing to hear pertinent evidence,8 5
or by any misbehavior which prejudiced the rights of the parties; 86
where the arbitrators exceeded their authority 8 7 or imperfectly exe-
cuted their powers ; 88 and where there was no valid contract and the
objections had been raised under the conditions set forth in Section
1458. The court will not interfere unless there is shown a ground
as set forth specifically in this section. 89 If none is forthcoming, the
award is considered impregnable.90
Section 1462 (a) requires the court to modify the award 91 where
there was an evident miscalculation of figures 92 or an evident mistake
in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the
award, where the arbitrators have awarded upon matters not sub-
mitted to them which do not affect the merits of the decision,93 and
where the award is imperfect in a matter of form.94
79 Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349, 198 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1923).80 Everitt v. Board of Education of City of Buffalo, 131 Misc. 507, 228
N. Y. Supp. 222 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without otinion, 224 App. Div. 779, 230
N. Y. Supp. 832 (4th Dep't 1928).
81 Cf. Romanoff v. Nilow Realty Corp., 273 App. Div. 788, 75 N. Y. S. 2d
666 (2d Dep't 1947) (not a party to the proceeding).8 2 Brody v. Owen, 259 App. Div. 720, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 28 (2d Dep't 1940).
83 Miller v. Weiner, 260 App. Div. 444, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 120 (1st Dep't
1940); Shirley Silk Co., Inc. v. American Silk Mills, Inc., 260 App. Div. 57,
23 N. Y. S. 2d 254 (1st Dep't 1940).
84 Navarro's Application, 266 App. Div. 181, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 585 (1st Dep't
1943).85 Universal Metal Products Co. v. U. E. R. & M. W. of A. Local 1225
Union, 179 Misc. 1044, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
88 Cf. Bridgeman & Holtzman v. Gondek, 235 App. Div. 129, 256 N. Y.
Supp. 491 (2d Dep't 1932).
87 See note 82 supra.8 8 Hauck v. Rochester Taxicab Co., 127 Misc. 759, 217 N. Y. Supp. 2
(Sup. Ct. 1926).
89 Goff & Sons, Inc. v. Rheinauer, 199 App. Div. 617, 192 N. Y. Supp. 92
(1st Dep't 1922).
90 Pine Street Realty Co., Inc. v. Coutroulos, 233 App. Div. 404, 253 N. Y.
Supp. 174 (1st Dep't 1931).91 See note 79 supra.
92 In re Blaikie, 206 App. Div. 740, 199 N. Y. Supp. 911 (1st Dep't 1923)
(reduction of arbitrator's fees); Kutsukian v. Bossom, 270 App. Div. 396, 60
N. Y. S. 2d 27 (1st Dep't 1946) (mistake in multiplication).93 Amalgamated Watch v. Jaeger Watch, 270 App. Div. 802, 59 N. Y. S.
2d 731 (1st Dep't 1946).9
,4Accord, Bond v. Shubert, 264 App. Div. 484 36 N. Y. S. 2d 147 (3d
Dep't 1942), affd zithout opinion, 290 N. Y. 901, 50 N. E. 2d 299 (1943).
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If a party wishes to modify or affirmatively vacate the award,
Section 1463 requires notice of a motion to this effect to be served
upon the adverse party within three months after the award is filed
or delivered. The timeliness of this motion is mandatory and may
not be disregarded whether the discrepancy is in matter of form or
of substance. 5 However, by virtue of this section, a defendant may
oppose a motion to confirm an award at any time on any of the
grounds specified in Section 1462.
If the award be confirmed, Section 1464 provides for the entry
of judgment thereon and Section 1465 sets forth what shall consti-
tute the judgment roll.9 6 By virtue of Section 1466, the judgment
entered is regarded in all respects as a judgment in an action sub-
ject to all the provisions of law relating o such judgment.97 Sec-
tion 1467 allows an appeal to be taken from the judgment entered
upon an award as from an order or judgment in an action.98
Section 1468 authorizes the continuance of arbitration agree-
ments on the death or incompetency of either party. The right to
arbitration will not be lost since whoever succeeds to the dispute suc-
ceeds also to the manner of settling it.9D
The final section of this article, 1469, has been interpreted as a
saving clause. The use of the words as set forth in this statute mani-
fest an intention on the part of the Legislature to recognize and per-
mit common law arbitration although an alternative and broader
method is permitted by this legislation.100  It states, ". . . And, ex-
cept as otherwise expressly prescribed therein [in Article 84], this
article does not affect a . . . contract made otherwise than as pre-
scribed therein . . ." If the parties demonstrate their intention to
arbitrate under the article, its requirements will prevail. If the par-
ties do not so manifest their purpose, common law principles con-
trol 101 except where this legislation is construed to be applicable to
both types of arbitration. 0 2
During recent years, arbitration has been increasingly adopted
in the settlement of commercial disputes. Prior to 1920 it had been
utilized only occasionally because of its unenforceability. In thirty
years it has become a recognized procedure of American business and
95 In re Mayo Realty Corp., 68 N. Y. S. 2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See note
94 supra.06 Cf. Jacobowitz v. Herson, 268 N. Y. 130, 197 N. E. 169 (1935).97 Arcadu v. Levinson, 250 N. Y. 355, 165 N. E. 809 (1929).98 Kutsukianr v. Bossom, 270 App. Div. 396, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 27 (1st Dep't
1946).
99 Buccini v. Paterno Construction Co., 253 N. Y. 256, 170 N. E. 910 (1930)
(executor) ; In re Lowenthal, 199 App. Div. 39, 191 N. Y. Sum. 282 (1st
Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 233 N. Y. 621, 135 N. E. 944 (1922) (receiver
of a corporation). See Note, 142 A. L. R. 1092 (1943).
100 See note 63 supra.
01 See Sandford Laundry, Inc. v. Simon, 285 N. Y. 488, 493, 35 N. E. Zd
182, 185 (1941).202 Hinkle v. Zimmertnan, 184 N. Y. 114, 76 N. E. 1080 (1906).
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commerce. Its growth can be accredited to sponsorship by organiza-
tions such as the American Arbitration Association, and to the gen-
eral practicality of most merchants. It is difficult to ascertain its de-
velopment statistically because the number of arbitration cases may
give an illusory picture. For example, a collapse in a certain market
or a run in specific goods in a particular market can cause a large
number of cases in a certain industry in any one year. Yet, we know
that the merchant is adapting himself more and more to its process
by insisting that some type of arbitration clause be included in his
contracts. This, in itself, is indicative of the trend.
"The language, spirit, and purpose of the Arbitration Law were
to keep such proceedings free from the technical practice of courts
of law and to avoid recourse to formal procedure required in court
actions." 103 Arbitration is a salutory arrangement recognized as
beneficial in practically every industry today. That it has become
increasingly advantageous to and approved by the merchant is con-
vincingly clear when one considers its role as a time and expense
saver. By this proceeding, parties are assured of a speedy disposi-
tion of their case because a prompter hearing results. By fixing a
time which is mutually desirable and convenient to all concerned
parties avoid adjournment and frequent appearances in court. The
arbitrators are generally in session more hours per day than their
counterparts in the legal forum and because of the absence of a jury,
much of the oratorical gibberish and byplay frequently necessary in
jury trials, is missing. This saving of time unquestionably tends to
reduce the costs involved to a necessary minimum. The proceeding
is simple and free from the many technicalities which confront and
retard litigation. The arbitrators are usually persons possessing the
qualifications necessary to immediately and completely appreciate the
issues involved, which in contrast to the preliminary and continual
enlightenment of the judge and jury in many court proceedings, is
highly desirable.
In a word, arbitration provides an accelerated and inexpensive
procedure resulting in an award conclusive in most cases, with little
of the enmity which often erupts in court litigation, destroying a
merchant's good will.
HARRY L. BRISTOL.
103 Smyth v. Board of Education of the Town of North Hempstead, 128
Misc. 49, 50, 217 N. Y. Supp. 231, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
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